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Currently in Australia, the number of injuries and deaths in the construction industry are at an 
unacceptable level.  Despite similar types of labour process, technology and tradespeople, one 
of the reasons for the industry’s poor safety performance is that no standard safety 
management systems exist.  Another factor is that the workforce is highly transient; with the 
industry relying largely on a small core of regular staff from the principal construction companies 
and on a large number of individuals and sub contractors from companies of varying sizes.  The 
team members of this CRC for Construction Innovation funded research project are examining 
the efficacy of creating nationally standardised safety competencies across the Australian 
construction industry in order to standardise safety practice and to identify the necessary 
accompanying safety behaviours. 
 
Another factor contributing to sub-optimal safety performance, identified by the research team, 
is the function of OHS regulation in the disparate Australian jurisdictions.  Not only are there 
nine principal OHS Acts, but all of these appear to be too heavily focused on enforcing 
compliance, without providing the necessary educational function that must, out of necessity, 
accompany Robens type of legislation - which is performance based and dependent on self 
regulation.  Focus groups and interviews with more than seventy key safety employees from ten 
of the eleven largest principal contractors in Australia indicate that, although self regulation is a 
cornerstone of performance based regulation, none of the enactments provide in detail what is 
specifically required to conform other than in the broadest generic terms.  Another common 
concern raised is that often when regulators are approached to provide specific detail of how to 
conform they refuse to provide it because they may be held accountable in the event of resulting 
injuries or fatalities.  Not furnishing the appropriate information and resources is contradictory 
and in contravention of the stated educational objectives espoused by the majority of the 
enactments.    
 
Keywords:  Safety Culture, Behaviour Based Safety, Regulation, Enforcement, Education 
Safety Culture in the Construction Industry: Changing behaviour through enforcement and education? 
Don Dingsdag 
 
Clients Driving Innovation: Moving Ideas into Practice (12-14 March 2006) 2 
Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) for Construction Innovation 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The sheet-anchor of the project on which this paper is based holds that, owing to the 
unacceptable numbers of injuries and deaths in the construction industry, a change of safety 
culture in the Australian construction industry is long overdue (vide for example, Parliament of 
Australia Department of the Parliamentary Library 2005; Johnstone, 2003).  Consequently, this 
paper unequivocally assumes an advocacy position by suggesting ways in which the industry 
can improve its safety performance through improving its safety culture.  As the title of the paper 
suggests, either enforcement or education may be the primary motivators of safety culture.  
More crudely put, these could be characterized as the stick or the carrot.  However, to suggest 
that either singly drives the desired safety culture is contentious and wrong-headed as in all 
probability, both are equally necessary and co-dependent as we intend to establish in this 
paper.  Complicating factors are that little conclusive industry specific research has been 
conducted on the efficacy of safety culture and that there are various competing and, at times, 
contradictory approaches to safety culture:  In the main there are two major approaches of 
which one relies on changing organizational safety culture by a change process that over a long 
time alters the norms, values and attitudes leading to the desired behavioural change:  The 
other, competing, model, behaviour based safety (BBS), relies on influencing behaviours which 
reduce ‘at risk behaviours’ thereby creating the desired safety culture.  As we discuss below, 
both have merit and disincentives; however quite clearly if the period for complete cultural 
turnaround espoused in some safety culture literature is seven years it is not surprising that the 
former approach has not been embraced in the Australian construction industry  Rather, the 
latter has met with greater acceptance, because it appears to produce results quickly, however 
as we discuss below the underpinning principles may be counterproductive to creating an 
enduring positive safety culture.   
 
In addition, we contend that the specific way in which OHS principal acts in Australia are 
constructed also has a profound influence on safety culture; they are penal codes and non-
compliance may result in large fines and in, extreme circumstances, gaol.  However, this type of 
persuasion does not necessarily produce a desirable safety culture:  Rather the instrumentalist 
type of safety culture/behaviours that results is predicated on basic compliance with legislative 
requirement and it does not produce the vision and values that a pro-active and vibrant safety 
culture requires in order to generate desirable safety behaviours.  Further, minimalist 
compliance, without striving to continually improve performance, is probably the major factor 
contributing to the Australian construction industry’s poor safety record which the excerpt from 
NOHSC below shows.   
 
Even though that typically, composite national statistics such as these obfuscate some aspects 
of fatalities such as those characterised obtusely as ‘ long term contact with chemicals or 
substances’ probably for the latter meaning death due to asbestosis or mesothelioma which have 
long latency ‘incubation’ periods and indicate contact with the hazardous substance perhaps 
thirty years prior to the death:  These deaths are reported and conflated with those due to 
electrocution euphemistically referred to as ‘contact with electricity‘ which occur on a recurring 
basis causing immediate death.  Further, this data set omits death due to falls from heights in 
construction specifically which probably accounts for 40 percent of all of the traumatic fatalities 
in construction (calculated from NOHSC Compendium of Workers’ Compensation Statistics 
Australia, 2001-02, pp. 24, 27).  Also, records of compensated injuries and deaths grossly 
underestimate the actual rates as there is a great deal of under-reporting of injuries in the 
construction industry, and an unknown number of work related deaths are not reported as such 
as they may occur a long time after the employee has left the particular employment or has 
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retired.  Yet another issue relates to the lag between the publication and the time of occurrence.  
Even so we must rely on the most accessible and the most recently available statistics which, 
notwithstanding the concerns expressed above, quite clearly show that safety performance in 
the construction industry requires major improvement.  
 
In 2002–03, the Construction industry employed approximately 5% of the Australian workforce but 
accounted for 9% of the accepted workers’ compensation claims involving one or more weeks off 
work that were lodged in that year.  The incidence of workplace injury and disease for the 
Construction industry in 2002–03 was 27 claims per 1000 employees equating to around 34 claims 
per day.  This was a decrease from the incidence rate of 34 claims per 1000 employees recorded 
in 1998–99 but remains much higher than the current national average of 16 claims per 1000 
employees. 
 
The incidence of workplace fatalities in this industry was 9.2 fatalities per 100 000 employees in 
2002–03 which was three times higher than the national average of 3.1 fatalities per 100 000 
employees.  Over the past five years the number of compensated fatalities has decreased from 51 
deaths in 1998–99 to 42 in 2002–03, but still remains the second highest of all industries. 
 
The most common type of injury/disease was sprains and strains accounting for 43% of all claims. 
The most common causes of compensated injury and disease in this industry in 2002–03 were: 
• body stressing (muscular stress due to manual handling or repetitive movement) which accounted 
for 36% of all claims; 
• falls, trips and slips of a person which accounted for 26% of all claims; and 
• being hit by moving objects which accounted for 16% of all claims. 
 
In 2002–03 the most common causes of compensated fatality in this industry were long term 
contact with chemicals or substances, which accounted for 30% of fatalities and contact with 
electricity which accounted for a further 17% of fatalities (NOHSC, 2004). 
 
The absolute necessity of leadership by senior management to create a proactive and beneficial 
safety culture or to change a negative safety culture we have examined and proclaimed 
elsewhere (viz, Biggs, Dingsdag, Sheahan, and Stenson, 2005; Cipolla, Biggs, Dingsdag, 
Sheahan, Sokolich & Artuso, 2005; Biggs, Sheahan and Dingsdag, 2005; Biggs, Dingsdag, 
Cipolla, Sokolich & Sheahan, 2005):  Consequently we do not discuss these necessary 
elements of achieving a desirable safety culture here because this is not the objective of this 
paper.  Rather, we suggest that as well as the primacy of executive management’s leadership in 
promoting safety culture the legislative ‘stick’ is essential, for without the necessary compliance 
that penal codes generate, construction industry safety performance would be even worse than 
the above statistics suggest.  Contradictory to our position that minimalist compliance is not 
desirable it is often the case that when an organization has suffered a major injury or multiple 
injuries or a fatality that subsequent to prosecution or lesser penal provisions it is galvanized 
into changing safety behaviours for the better and ‘turning the safety culture around.’  It may 
well be construed that such an event provides a pathway to education.  
 
Another complicating factor is that there is very little formal safety and health education for OHS 
officers and, of greater concern, for key personnel charged legally with the observance and 
enforcement of safety in the construction industry.  OHS legislation generically designates the 
employer, i.e. the general manager, the MD or ‘persons in control of premises’ and /or principal 
contractors, which most of Australia’s largest construction firms are, as having the ultimately 
responsibility for OHS.  Rather, the industry relies overly heavily on training of which some may 
have dubious value for safety performance; in the first instance because it does not target the 
correct safety competencies, nor is it intended to improve safety culture, nor does it reach the 
most appropriate employees, nor management.  Much training is steeped in competency based 
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principles which can have a major role in attaining the required skill competencies as well as the 
necessary safety behaviours, but the correct competencies must have foundation in appropriate 
educational values and technique.  Moreover, the trainers may be poorly trained themselves 
and they may not have the appropriate educational qualifications, or the necessary 
communication skills.  The result is that the cornerstone of safety culture, which is that safety is 
based on a shared ideology, i.e., the values, norms and behaviours or that ‘safety is 
everybody’s business’ in safety cultural terminology, is not getting through to the correct 
recipients because the essential message is miss-directed and it is also miss-communicated 
owing to the poor quality of the training and a lack of training in effective communication 
technique.  Even so, we endorse the necessity and the value of appropriate training for the 
construction industry and its role in producing the desired behaviours and contributing to an 
effective safety culture.  
 
2.0 ENFORCEMENT OR EDUCATION?; THE LAW 
 
As we outlined in the abstract and above, a major factor contributing to sub-optimal safety 
performance is the function of OHS regulation in the disparate Australian jurisdictions.  Not only 
are there nine principal OHS Acts, but all of these appear to be too heavily focused on enforcing 
compliance, without providing the necessary educational function that must, out of necessity, 
accompany this Robens type of legislation derived from the UK which aside from being a penal 
code (but not a criminal code even though in the UK and in some of the Australian jurisdictions 
more recently there is provision for criminal prosecution of some serious offences like industrial 
manslaughter) is performance based and dependent on self regulation by employers at their 
cost.  Robens legislation, first introduced in the UK in 1974 was intended to engender 
continuous improvement and improving standards in legislation within a goal setting legal 
framework supported by codes of practice and/or performance standards which could be 
revised more easily than primary legislation which may require difficult enactment passage in 
parliament.  By and large in the Australian jurisdictions these original intended directions were 
watered down or only enacted partially.  None of the current enactments provide in detail what 
is specifically required to conform other than in the broadest generic terms.  Examples we 
produce are taken from interviews conducted with 10 out of Australia’s eleven largest 
construction organizations (principal contractors) who are members of the Australian 
Constructors’ Association (ACA) Further, often when regulators’ inspectorates are approached 
to provide specific detail of how to conform they refuse to provide it because they may be held 
accountable in the event of resulting injuries or fatalities.  In the instance of WorkCover NSW a 
typical response received when asking focus group participants of one ACA member company 
about their interactions with the inspectorate was:  
 
…we go to WorkCover and we talk to them, all the time, and they don’t they’re not, they won’t give 
us a clear ruling on stuff.  They will definitely not give you anything written, but they are really 
standoffish because they’re worried about being loaded in the barrel themselves.  I mean we 
should all be talking.  Sub-contractors, principal contractors, and WorkCover to all talk together to 
make the whole place a better place.   
 
Another participant retorted,  ‘That comment about they won’t give you anything written, I get 
plenty of them, prosecutions.’  Some participants during a focus group with another of the 10 
ACA member organizations defended WorkCover: 
 
The regulator, to be fair to the regulator he is caught between a rock and a hard place, he is 
certainly extremely under-resourced, under-funded and they have got a couple of people in there 
now that have got the right sort of attitude you know certainly… 
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So there is a good alignment, we need to sort of promote that alliance and engage them, it’s very 
difficult for them than it is for us because of their staffing levels and their ability to get around the 
industry. 
 
It may be construed that there is no OHS education required at law and that behaviourial 
change is achieved by inducing compliance from organizations because they have been 
punitively dealt with through fines or in the most extreme circumstances by prosecutions.  Either 
of these can be costly.  In NSW for example the maximum fine for the newly introduced 
‘industrial manslaughter’ provisions is $1.65 million for an organization and $165 000 for 
individuals (Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000, NSW, Section 32A (in actuality the fines 
are expressed as penalty units (at $110 for each unit) with 15 000 for the former and 1 500 for 
the latter).  Quite clearly, the perceived stick in this extreme circumstance should provide 
motivation for organizations for the much more desirable carrot of proactive OHS education.  
 
As part of this research, management representatives of all of the States’ and Territories’ OHS 
regulators were interviewed.  It was put to them that precedence for OHS legislation to be based 
on education rather than enforcement existed by quoting the Montana Safety Culture Act, 1993 
from the State of Montana in the USA.   
 
To quote from Industrial Safety & Hygiene News;  
The safety culture act distributes responsibility down the line, away from government-only, 
watchdog-type laws.  It puts the government in the role as educator for safety, not the enforcer.  
For example, the Labor and Industry Department sponsors an on-site safety and health 
consultation program as well as one to promote safety education in public schools (Hough, 2000)  
What is unique about this approach is that workers’ compensation insurance providers assume 
the primary enforcement function, not the regulator, viz; 
Now insurers, not the state, enforce safety regulations through consultations, warnings, penalties, 
and fines.  Every employer is required to have workers’ comp insurance.  They can chose private 
or state insurance (the one connection the state has to penalties and fines is the state-sponsored 
workers’ comp insurance fund), or chose to self-insure.  If an employer doesn’t want a safety 
program, their premium could be doubled (Hough, 2000). 
It would be interesting to speculate how such an approach, if it were embraced by the Australian 
OHS regulators, would affect safety performance if they could concentrate on providing 
education, training, information and advice.  Also, there is a primary mandatory educational 
function for employers under the Montana Safety Culture Act which is foreign to Robens type 
legislation in Australia although the educational elements of the Act feature prominently in the 
principal Australian OHS acts as regulatory requirements, e.g.; 
Employers, as part of this integral system, have to do more than just purchase insurance.  
Companies are required to establish and maintain an educational-based training program which 
includes the following: ·  
• A general safety orientation for every employee before they begin work; · 
• Job-specific training before the employee begins that task, then annual refresher safety 
training; ·  
• A system of building employee awareness through posters, newsletters, meetings, and safety 
incentive programs; ·  
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• Periodic self-inspections for hazard assessment at least annually; ·  
• Lastly, documentation of all activities (Hough, 2000). 
 
Also, employers with more than five employees must have a comprehensive safety program with 
policies that specifically define employee responsibility and safety performance accountability; 
procedures for reporting, investigating, and taking corrective action on all work-related accidents, 
injuries, illnesses, incidents and known unsafe work conditions or practices (Hough, 2000). 
 
Most of the interviewees did not know of the existence of this legislation.  Admittedly it is unique 
even in the USA.  Some of the senior managers of three regulatory bodies interviewed 
expressed refreshingly frank views on both the efficaciousness of enforcement and 
endorsement of a stronger education function as a supplement to enforcement to procure 
compliance (Biggs, Dingsdag, Sheahan and Stenson, 2005).  In their view, better resources 
could facilitate the provision of education, training, information and advice which supports our 
position on the instrumentalist nature of competency based training.  The lack of resources in 
each of the jurisdictions is well known; for example, in human resources WorkCover NSW has 
at the time of writing 301 inspectors whereas there are some 325 000 workplaces in NSW.  
Complicating factors are that even though each of the inspectorates has prosecutorial powers, 
in some jurisdictions, e.g. in the ACT, prosecutions of organizations must be undertaken in the 
Magistrate’s Court where unlike in OHS jurisdictional hearings, such as the NSW Industrial 
Magistrate or the Industrial Relations Commission, criminal levels of proof may be required and 
intent established.  Consequently, prosecutions fail or fines imposed are trifling commensurate 
to the infringement and do not act as a deterrent and do not lead to the proactive OHS 
education process mentioned above.   
 
When asked why there has not been a greater focus on education one manager in one major 
jurisdiction in particular related that in the past there had been a voluntary information service 
for small contractors in construction which initially functioned well.  However, this service was 
staffed by inspectors who subsequently had to issue infringements or prosecute contractors 
who had attended the sessions:  According to this informant, contractors thought that they had 
been ‘set up’ and the service was discredited and disbanded.  Several of the interviewed 
managers were enthusiastic about the potential of safety culture based on educational 
principles to procure superior safety outcomes in that this approach encouraged individuals to 
act and think safely on their own initiative rather than simply complying with OHS laws.  They 
characterized mere compliance as minimalist and undesirable.  One commented that under 
existing legislative provisions the current management of site safety has not proven adequate in 
reducing risk exposure as lost time injury (LTI) and fatality rates for the construction industry in 
Australia testify (in each of Australia’s states and territories construction has consistently been 
amongst the highest rates of any industry).  This manager, although firmly endorsing the 
incorporation of safety culture into current legislation, maintained that penal provisions such as 
those contained in the current Robens style principal OHS acts must remain to keep the 
construction industry ‘honest’ (Biggs, Dingsdag, Sheahan and Stenson, 2005).  As noted above, 
we fully support that position.   
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3.0 SAFETY CULTURAL CHANGE V BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE/ THE 
CARROT OR THE STICK? 
 
In effect, the two main approaches to safety culture outlined above, of which one relies on 
changing organizational safety culture incrementally leading to the desired behavioural change 
and the behavioural model, BBS, which depends on modifying behaviours directly to create the 
desired safety culture also equate to enforcement or education as the main motivators.  The 
safety cultural model has many variants which all share a commonality.  A typical approach is 
that either internal or external change agents are brought in to change the safety culture slowly 
over time and a common theme is that there is resistance to change principally because, 
‘…many of the changes needed are viewed negatively by one or more levels of the organization 
(Simon and Simon, 1996, p. 522)’.  What is meant is that typically employees and middle 
management resist and/or obstruct change.  The essence of this approach is that the attitudes 
and beliefs of an organizational unit or group have their origins in the cultural norms and 
assumption of the group’s members, in this instance to resist and obstruct just as the group’s 
shared beliefs and attitudes may fully subscribe to the desired safety culture.  What is essential 
in order to change this negative culture is to understand how it is formed and how it can be 
changed.  The knowledge, skills or tools to affect change are many and varied and, as outlined 
above, may take many years to achieve.  Generally, for a dynamic industry like construction this 
approach has limited appeal; its cost and labour intensive and it may not deliver the desired 
outcomes.   
 
Conversely, the BBS approach has more appeal to the Australian construction industry and our 
interviews and focus group results indicate that the behavioural based approach is a better ‘fit’ 
and is operating with some success in some of the 10 member organizations of the ACA.  The 
predisposition to BBS in the industry is not entirely unexpected; it appears to produce quick, but 
perhaps not measurable, results and it conforms neatly to the enforcement approach embedded 
in the principal OHS legislation.  In brief, according to Tom Krause, a principal exponent of a 
BBS approach which is claimed has success in Australia ; 
 
Behavioral theory focuses on the main behaviors that lead to accidents rather than the accidents 
themselves, which are relatively infrequent and difficult to investigate objectively, or attitudes 
which are difficult to change.  Behavioral methods are proactive and focus on potential risky 
behavior.  BBS involves identifying, through observation, behaviors which are safe and those 
which involve risk of injury (Krause, 2002).  
 
A typical critique of the method is to be found in Simon and Simon, viz; 
 
Some safety behavior consultants reject the notion that you should manage attitudes and yet they 
speak about the importance of “culture.”  They say “manage behaviors, not attitudes.”  “You can’t 
see attitudes, but you can observe behaviors.”  “Get people to behave the way you want them to 
behave and their attitudes will change.”  These beliefs are based on Pavlov’s and Skinner’s 
behaviorism theories, as well as a fear of invading people’s privacy Simon and Simon, 1996, p. 
523).  
 
Not surprisingly Krause vehemently defends these attributions.  Our research so far has not yet 
fully determined which paradigm will produce the most enduring and appropriate safety 
performance for the Australian construction industry.  Even though we disavow the use of the 
term ‘accident’ by Krause because its use suggests an unforeseen, unpredictable and 
unpreventable event, we are inclined towards the BBS approach to drive safety culture change.  
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However, we should state that the backbone of our CRC CI research project is to identify the 
necessary skills, knowledge, abilities and the required safety behaviour attributes for essential 
safety personnel in the Australian construction industry to create a safety skills matrix for ‘safety 
critical positions’ that can be used by the industry nationally.  Notwithstanding, BBS cannot 
thrive in a safety culture vacuum.  Consequently, the necessary pre-conditions of a vibrant, 
viable safety culture resides in having management commitment and the provision of leadership 
driven by appropriate and relevant communication:  In other words, these are the cornerstones 
of the safety culture approach without which BBS cannot function adequately.    
 
Further, safety culture must be created and nurtured by senior management, supported by 
policies, procedures, the necessary resources and communicated throughout the organization:  
The findings of our research project so far strongly confirm the safety culture (and safety 
climate) literature relative to the essentiality of senior management leadership and the necessity 
of appropriate and timely communication:  In other words, not only is visible leadership highly 
significant, but the way in which safety is communicated is important so that the message is 
perceived as being meaningful and representative of the organization’s policies and procedures.  
It’s also imperative that safety communications are appropriate for the recipient so that they 
cannot be misunderstood.  To return to the primary theme of the paper, as well as the primacy 
of executive management’s leadership in promoting safety culture as the ‘carrot’ the legislative 
‘stick’ is also essential; for, the necessary impetus that penal codes produce ensures 
implementation, maintaining and improvement of OHS provisions.  In addition, there is a far 
greater requirement for education than currently exists, both in terms of promoting 
understanding of the function of safety culture in producing the desired behaviours as well as in 
improving the quality of training.   
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